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This article argues that ‘Critical International Relations,’ often counterpoised to ‘mainstream IR,’ 
has come to function as a major theoretical category in its own right. It argues that critique involves 
‘minor theorising,’ defined as the practice of disturbing settled theoretical assumptions in the 
discipline. The article examines the role and significance of ‘minor theories’ in the context of 
ongoing debates about Critical IR. It argues that critique is defined by context, and is politically and 
ethically ambiguous. The article concludes that the scope for critique could be advanced if the terms 




In the 1980s ‘Critical International Relations Theory’ began to be rhetorically counter-posed to 
‘Mainstream IR Theory.’1 ‘Critical IR’ is not a marginal subfield or theoretical subculture of 
disciplinary IR. Academic departments, particularly in the UK, self-define as leaders in Critical IR, 
and sections at leading International Conventions self-define using the nomenclature of Critical IR. 
The label ‘Critical’ is used in IR job descriptions, as an identifier carrying symbolic capital. The rise 
of ‘Critical IR’ as a recognised category during the last three decades has been accompanied by the 
institutionalisation of various Critical sub-disciplines in book series with major publishers and 
Journals explicitly devoted to giving space to ‘Critical’ forms and styles of IR knowledge production 
– with titles like Critical Security Studies, Critical Military Studies, or Critical Terrorism Studies. 
These journals determine their object of study as a field of scholarship around an issue (like 
Terrorism, Militarism or Security), which ‘Critical IR Scholars’ argued they can address with 
greater nuance or under a guiding ethos of emancipation.2 Major international studies journals now 
expressly seek “submissions from allied critical traditions,”3 which means that adopting the title of 
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‘Critical IR Scholar’ may be viewed as a professional obligation in these settings, especially by 
younger academics. 
Should scholars committed to the vocation of academic critique be celebrating the rise to 
power of ‘Critical IR’ as an identifying label? After all, it appears to have aided theoretical 
pluralisation within disciplinary IR, and opened space for novel, often ethically and politically 
engaged, scholarship. This article contributes to an emerging body of work in the discipline asking 
whether scholarship in IR needs to “bring the sword of criticism to criticism itself.”4 The article 
argues that the identifier ‘Critical IR Scholar’ has become a problematic label by which to describe 
academics, giving rise to significant downsides for scholarship in the field. To some extent this is a 
permutation of the problem of categorisation and labelling that all academic disciplines face. All 
theoretical categories commonly used in IR, such as Realism, Idealism, Liberalism, are all known 
to hide diversity, and Critical IR is no different.5 In this article, I argue that ‘Critical IR,’ as a category 
of scholarship, creates specific sociological and methodological issues that are distinct from the 
problem of categorisation in general, because it can undermine the practice of critique itself.  
The article begins by examining the difference between the practice of critique within the 
academic field of IR and the critiques people conduct in their everyday lives. Following Deleuze 
and Guattari, and Katz,6 I argue that what distinguishes the practice of critique is a “minor” 
relationship to established theoretical literatures about IR, which have distinctive historical and 
sociological conditions. Scholarly critique involves ‘minor theorising’ because it disturbs settled 
theoretical assumptions that structure debates within any academic setting. This is not the same as 
‘criticism’ in an everyday sense, or speaking in the name of marginalised groups in society.  
The second section explores the rise of ‘Critical IR’ as a sociological category within the 
discipline, distinct from the practice of critique. This section observes that ‘synoptic’ understandings 
of the role of critique in IR, as developed by Hoffman (1989), and updated by Levine (2012), make 
the case that Critical IR theoretical projects all cohere around the pursuit of reflexivity.7 I argue that 
this synoptic framing of ‘Critical IR’ inhibits the practice of critique inasmuch as it operates as an 
injunction to nuance. The article then examines ‘anti-synoptic’ accounts Critical IR, and of the role 
of critique in IR, which can also be traced back to the late 1980s.8 Examining the contemporary 
disciplinary subfields of Decolonial and Queer IR, this section outlines the problems that can follow 
from the presumption that engaging in critique signifies possession of a virtuous Critical identity, 
and that ‘to be Critical’ scholars have to go ‘beyond’ disciplinary IR. 
The final section draws on the previous arguments to answer the question ‘What is a minor 
International Theory’. I conclude that the scope for academic critique within IR will be advanced if 
the terminology of ‘Critical IR’ and the ‘Critical IR Scholar’ are dropped from scholarly parlance. 
Firstly, scholarly critique in IR will become more methodologically rigorous by abandoning the 
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assumption of moral probity as a defining characteristic. Secondly, scholarly critique in IR will 
become more useful inasmuch as it will be communicable to relevant audiences as distinct from 
ideological positioning. This will enrich debates about the politics and ethics of IR theory, rather 
than conflating politics and ethics with disciplinarity. 
 
On lay and academic critique in IR 
It has been proposed that is difficult to distinguish between critiques taking place within the 
sociological setting of professional academia and critiques occurring within the settings of 
politicians, torturers, military officials, or people selected at random from the general population.9 
In this section, I argue that critique means something distinctive within the academic field of 
International Relations. I also distinguish between practicing critique in any academic discipline, 
and self-defining as a ‘Critical Scholar’ of IR. 
The term ‘Critical’ has a specific genealogy within IR as a field of study. It emerged in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s to mark the difference between so-called ‘mainstream’ theoretical 
schools of thought and approaches born out of new conceptual and methodological tools drawn from 
adjacent disciplines, including continental philosophy, anthropology, and feminist sociology.10 Its 
use as an identifying label by scholars in IR is often associated with the revival of Marxian accounts 
in the context of the ‘inter-paradigm debate’,11 drawing from the Gramscian tradition popularised 
by Robert Cox (1981) in making a distinction between ‘Problem Solving’ and ‘Critical’.12 During 
the 1990s, ‘Critical’ began to be used widely as an identifying label in IR.13 Two broad strands 
within Critical IR could be differentiated by their attitude to the revival of theoretical pluralism at 
this time.14  
During the early 1990s a group of scholars drawing from the Frankfurt School tradition in 
philosophy proposed re-centring the discipline of IR on ‘Critical’ theory. This would bring the 
assumptions held by existing major paradigms (like Neorealism and Neoliberalism) about 
objectivity, power, scientific method and prediction, into question. These self-describing ‘Critical’ 
scholars committed to emancipation as a core scholarly concern, which could re-orientate the field 
around a shared or synoptic vision of the discipline’s vocation for fostering emancipation.15 IR’s 
various Critical Studies Journals tend to enunciate this case for the emancipatory potential of 
‘Critical’ theoretical work in IR today.  
The second broad strand of ‘Critical’ IR derived from Francophone philosophy, especially 
Foucault’s account of the relationship between power and knowledge in the social sciences, and 
often involves a particular reading of Kant’s account of enlightenment.16 Scholars drawing from 
feminist, continental, and poststructuralist philosophy in the late 1980s and early 1990s developed 
a radical critique of the idea of progress in IR, tied to wider critique of the logics of modernity 
(including patriarchy and colonialism) finding expression as disciplinary IR.17 They agreed that the 
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distinguishing characteristic of ‘critique’ is that it disturbs the assumptions of settled mainstream IR 
theories, but argued that critique cannot form the nucleus for disciplinary reform. Rather they 
advocated for a de-disciplinarisation, moving ‘beyond IR’ into a purified Critical post-disciplinary 
or trans-disciplinary space.18 Only such de-disciplinarisation would allow self-describing Critical 
IR scholars to speak to the needs and interests of groups excluded from the concerns of mainstream 
IR theory. This linked, explicitly, academic marginalisation within IR to the marginalisation of 
communities or other actors in world politics on racial, cultural, gendered or class lines.19 Sjoberg 
has articulated this reading of Critical international theory as a “noncumulative” or anti-synoptic 
project, on the assumption that privileging marginalised forms of knowledge production fosters 
scholarship that better serves the needs of all marginalised groups in world politics, and that this 
project requires moving beyond disciplinary IR.20  
 What critique means for IR, and what it means ‘to be a Critical IR Scholar’, has always been 
subject to debate. The term Critical IR is now used to refer to diverse theoretical subcultures, 
including Frankfurt School, Gramscian, poststructuralist, feminist, marxist, post-marxist, 
postcolonial, queer, and decolonial theorists, which overlap, combine and assemble in various ways. 
Its manifestations in academic practice are correspondingly diverse: in scale and number of 
adherents, as well as in epistemologies, ontologies and methodologies.21 The term ‘Critical IR’ 
clearly hides internal diversity, as all categories do,22 but the category ‘Critical’ has been identified 
as uniquely ambiguous and thus potentially suspect.23  
To understand why, it is necessary to examine how self-describing Critical IR Scholars 
articulate the commonalities across different approaches, and the integrative role of the category 
‘Critical IR’. Synoptic and anti-synoptic Critical IR scholars, from diverse theoretical subcultures, 
argue that critique is characterised by a concern for “tracing and challenging given limits” in IR, 
which are in turn associated with material and discursive architectures of oppression.24 The 
marginalisation of those who, for example, lack a state, are impoverished, hold ambiguous identity, 
or belong to a race or gender identity subject to discrimination, can only be addressed through efforts 
to enhance disciplinary ‘reflexivity’ with respect to IR’s theoretically given limits.25 Reflexivity 
helps scholars to better recognise the relationship between facts and values in IR, and better manage 
the tendency to confuse concepts of analysis for the world analysed. Reflexivity improves 
cognisance of scholarly positionality or bias. Critical IR scholars all agree that ‘being Critical’ is 
related to ‘being reflexive’. What is at stake between synoptic and anti-synoptic strands of Critical 
IR is the question of whether reflexivity can become a disciplinary method or technology, or 
whether ‘being Critical’ requires reflexively ‘going beyond’ the category of disciplinary IR 
altogether.26  
Borrowing from francophone critical sociology, some related debates have recently been 
imported into IR, which ask whether academic critique is really not so unlike ‘everyday’ critique.27 
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These arguments centre around the sociological study of the ‘the way people argue’ about things.28 
Any IR scholar, inasmuch as they are engaged with empirical material, is entangled with social 
relations that involve criticism, and has an obligation to take seriously the reflexive facilities of the 
everyday actors one is engaged with as a researcher. 29 Attention to ‘lay’ resources of ‘reflexivity’ 
is seen as facilitating understanding of the contingent and ambiguous qualities of critique. For 
example, emancipation can mean different things to different people, so the idea that one can be 
‘critical’ as opposed to a ‘problem-solver’ appears overly simplistic.  
Recent work has also highlighted that pre-existing political and ethical positions constitute 
frames by which “critical” and “uncritical” works are differentiated from one another in IR 
scholarship, suggesting it may be difficult to reflexively disentangle assumptions about what 
constitutes ‘the good’ from scholarly determinations of the critical.30 Identifying as ‘Critical’ is often 
viewed as a statement of alliance with the oppressed or marginalised: Whereas actors may perceive 
themselves to be oppressed, use critiques to explain that condition, yet advocate for reactionary 
politics, racism or gender violence building on these critiques in search of their emancipation from 
power structures they perceive as unjustly constraining them.31 Recognising the ubiquity of its 
practice in ‘everyday life’ is to see that critique can be politically and ethically ambiguous.32 
The assumption that critique within an academic space is identical to critique in the everyday 
sense of ‘criticism’ deserves more careful scrutiny, as authors like Billig33 and Felski34 have 
suggested. The suspicion of settled assumptions underwriting all critiques arises from complex 
social settings. Yet the setting of scholarship is distinct, and academia is a field of practice wherein 
actors possess different capabilities and engage in specific kinds of activity (academic publishing, 
teaching, and going to conferences) which are unavailable to lay actors. Scholarly settings involve 
sociological dynamics which capture criticism for distinct purposes, under different power relations. 
Entry of new academic members into IR is controlled by existing ‘insider’ communities, and IR is 
well known to have specific power relations that constitute the conditions for criticism, which may 
be related to, but are not identical to the structures which organise other fields or everyday life.35  
Disciplinary IR is a distinctive setting for critique because what is in dispute amongst IR 
scholars are discipline-specific theoretical and social formations, tied to the literary paradigms that 
structure debates within the field.36 Professional scholarship is a field of relationships between actors 
in which “control of the reproduction of the institution (that is, control of positions, appointments, 
and of the allocation of financial and other resources)” is a determinant factor for reception as a 
major figure or member of a major disciplinary body. Policing the boundaries of what constitutes a 
major contribution to scholarship often involves “softer formulas, such as censorship through 
academic propriety”, which include the obligation to reference ‘major’ figures or ‘major’ research 
programmes irrespective of the degree to which one finds them relevant.37 International theories are 
outputs of a social practice, extended through time, which designates the boundaries of what a 
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legitimate problem is within IR scholarly communities and literatures, and function as markers of 
identity, status and prestige, leveraged in disciplinary struggles for power.38 IR theories are self-
disciplining material and intellectual assemblages, with physical and social architectures, and 
internal rules and codes, taking shape as distinct IR literatures.39  
 This is a useful starting point for assessing the function of ‘Critical IR’ as an identifying 
category within the discipline today. In their essay, What is a Minor Literature, the philosophers 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (2004) argued that every language (whether spoken widely or not) 
has a “major use” which enacts coherence, creates rules, and seeks to hold meaning firm within an 
architecture of grammar and terminological associations. The major usage reflects the manner in 
which all linguistic forms are tied up with specific social and cultural codes and material institutions 
or assemblages. Every language (scientific or otherwise) also has a “minor use” which disturbs these 
codes, making the language “stammer and proliferate”. A minor use of any literature breaks or bends 
grammatical rules, and in the process, let new insinuations or literary forms take shape.40 Deleuze 
and Guattari were interested in how languages are attended by processes of variation at their edges; 
local idioms, rule-breaking, hybridisation and mixture with neighbouring languages.41 They argued 
that such variation is attached to scientific, political and artistic creativity. When one submits a 
language to minor use, as they argued the author Franz Kafka did to the German in which he wrote, 
it opens the potential to find new uses for words, to say new things, or express problems 
differently.42  
In her 1996 essay “Towards Minor Theory”, Cindi Katz argued that Deleuze and Guattari 
provided tools to examine practices of theorisation and the production of knowledge within her 
discipline of Geography.43 Katz noted that “the major and minor are not so much different languages 
as different uses or treatments of the same language”.44 ‘Minor uses’ are such not because they are 
written by or for a minority, but because they disturb a major architecture of orthodoxies, 
assumptions, and rules that constrain expression, thinking and doing. For Katz, ‘minor theory’ was 
a useful concept because it revealed the complex relationship between criticality and marginality in 
her academic “present moment” orientated by the “cultural turn” in the social sciences during the 
1980s and 1990s. This ‘turn’ had brought greater attention to intersecting economic, gendered and 
racialized power relations ignored by mainstream theoretical paradigms across the social sciences.45  
For Katz, the distinction between minor and major theory was a tool to examine unequal 
relationships between critical theoretical traditions, particularly feminism and Marxism. Katz did 
not propose a “binary” account of the relationship between minor and major theory: 
 
“I want to suggest not a simple opposition but an interpolation of major with minor theory. 
Following Deleuze and Guattari, I consider major theory to be contextually defined. It encompasses 
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the theory or theories that are dominant in a particular historical geography under a specific set of 
conditions. It is major because it is dominant in a particular historical geography, not the reverse. 
Minor theory, then, might best be conceptualized as interstitial. It is defined as minor in relation to 
a dominant major theory, but as the contexts change, so too can the designations of major and minor 
or the boundaries between them… as a feminist in the academy interested in oppositional theory 
during the 1970s, I operated within a discursive formation—and practical politics—that was 
Marxist. Within this specific and perhaps small mud puddle, Marxist theory was 'major theory'”46  
 
Katz’s reading of minor theory as ‘interstitial’ and ‘contextual’ provides a toolbox for 
reflecting on the problem of critique within the context of theoretical pluralism in IR today. IR 
theories constitute major literatures, inasmuch as they are identified with specific presentational 
styles, jargons, lingos, terms, references and assumptions that define what knowledge is within that 
category, setting and historical moment. These tacit rules are policed through peer review, by editors 
and by hiring panels. Critical IR scholars consensually understand their work as disturbing the 
norms and assumptions that organise ‘mainstream’ IR theories, so we may fruitfully understand 
Critical IR as pursuing a ‘minor use’ of theory in an ideal sense. To engage in ‘minor theorising’ is 
not, however, the same as being critical of something in an ‘everyday’ sense. It is to conduct 
academic work which disturbs a body of norms of articulation within theoretical scholarship in a 
particular time and disciplinary location. This is why ‘reflexivity’ about IR requires a level of 
expertise often unavailable to ‘lay’ actors.47  
Katz’s reading of Deleuze and Guattari is not uncontested. Whitehall implicitly challenges 
Katz’s vision of the minor theory as interpolated with the major, inasmuch as he emphasises that 
minor theory does “not necessarily” have any relationship to the major.48 For Whitehall, mainstream 
disciplinary IR is the major literature. He suggests that critical work in IR must be work that seeks 
to become otherwise, irrespective of disciplinary assumptions.  His implication is that Critical IR is 
problematic inasmuch as it is insufficiently indifferent to mainstream IR and its settled assumptions 
about, for example, sovereignty and modernity. Minor theory is valued positively, for Whitehall, 
because it necessitates doing something other than IR.49  By contrast, Katz, in viewing minor theory 
as always contextually and relationally defined, was suggesting that minor theories (in the plural) 
are interpolated with diverse major theories (in the plural) in any academic sociological context. For 
her, therefore, the major and minor are uses within every literature or discipline, and theories may 
change position and appear as ‘major’ or ‘minor’ in different contexts. This opened up the potential 
for considering the ambiguity of minor theories, and their complex relationship to major theories.  
I follow Katz account here because, to my reading, it was central to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
argument that there are no guarantees in the departure from categorisation per se. To provide some 
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background, Deleuze and Guattari’s two principle texts were AntiOedipus (1972) and A Thousand 
Plateaus (1988), in between which they wrote Towards a Minor Literature (1986).50 Over the course 
of this collaborative work, Deleuze and Guattari sought to draw attention to the dangers that 
accompanied all minor literatures (or ‘lines of flight’). A Thousand Plateaus broke from the binary 
argument of Anti-Oedipus, which had counter-posed the major (bad/totalitarian) to minor 
(good/creative). The later book argued for “caution” because, they suggested, minor literatures can 
lead to the entrenchment of new majoritarian formations, or descend into wholly destructive, 
suicidal, masochistic, sadistic or fascistic urges.51 In this sense, Katz appears to be following 
Deleuze and Guattari in arguing that minor theories should be understood with respect to specific 
conditions of utterance within her discipline, rather than as a generically virtuous exodus from it.  
In this light, the minor status of self-describing ‘Critical approaches’ to IR three decades ago 
cannot provide an on-going condition for the possibility of critique within this discipline. Nor should 
‘being Critical’ be conflated with a virtuous ‘minor’ exit from disciplinary IR altogether. Rather, 
‘Critical’ approaches to IR have shown increasing capacity to order the material, social and 
institutional conditions for academic work within IR (for example, hiring and publishing practices, 
and organisational leadership), and therefore include various major literatures (Gramscian and 
Feminist IR, for example, are now well-established, important, major literatures). To evaluate the 
role of critique in international theory today requires acknowledging the distinctive architecture of 
IR theories and their material conditions which structure this setting, but also the role that the label 
‘Critical’ itself has in constituting a setting in which IR scholars who identify as such are not 
marginal, and may themselves be placed within major disciplinary power relations. 
Minor theories, inasmuch as they disturb settled theoretical assumptions, by definition 
involve critique. Where I differ sharply from Katz , alongside Whitehall, is that I see few grounds 
to assume that the criticality promised by minor theories tends towards being virtuous, or ethically 
and politically desirable.52 Disturbing settled literary assumptions can involve being racist, 
homophobic, a religious fanatic, an extreme nationalist, an advocate of cathartic violence for the 
purpose of personal pleasure, or carelessly pursuing self-aggrandisement and professional prestige 
as a ‘marginalised’ academic radical.53 Deleuze and Guattari made clear that they saw minor 
theories as creative and intellectually enlivening, but for the same reason possessing diverse ethical 
and political, wholly self-interested, murderous, or self-destructive consequences.54 Inasmuch as it 
is always related to minor theory, critique is a condition of possibility for new international ethics 
or politics that are good, bad or ugly in realisation. Taking leave from the disciplinary mainstream 
can be but it is clearly not necessarily a virtue.  
This is a reflection on the intellectual context of today. In our era, marginal reactionary 
thinkers are having an outsized practical influence in world politics, widely referenced by populist 
statesmen, alt-right groups, ultra-nationalists, and white supremacists, and described by such groups 
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as emancipating them from the fetters of modernist ideology.55 To critique effectively we must 
recognise that these marginal thinkers are critical about things too. The distinction first proposed in 
the 1980s between a sovereign modernity playing out as IR and virtuous marginalised critics who 
seek an exit from the power relations of the discipline, is a rhetorical trope that might appear to have 
passed its sell-by-date in an era defined by reactionary critiques of modernism in IR.56  
Disciplinary IR is a loose assemblage of major literatures, tied together by a network of 
social relations, and material institutions like departments, associations and journals, within which 
some assumptions are more settled than others, each showing a complex intellectual genealogy. 
There is no essence of IR literatures, organising all its settled assumptions. Undoubtedly settled 
major theoretical assumptions about IR can and have harmed the interests of specific groups, 
minorities and global majorities.57 How they have done so, and may continue to do so, is an 
empirical question. The major or mainstream status of a theory within academic IR is an imperfect 
heuristic for comprehending these political, social or cultural consequences, or role in human 
emancipation or oppression. For the same reason, conducting minor theoretical work that disturbs 
settled disciplinary assumptions is unable to provide surety of likeable impacts. This is to suggest 
that more critical thinking about ‘Critical IR’, as a definitional term or category, is called for today. 
 
Critical IR and the Discipline 
‘Critical IR’ may involve a synoptic58 or anti-synoptic59 attitude to the role of critique for the 
discipline of IR as a whole. In this section I engage with synoptic approaches which argue that 
Critical IR can bring diverse theoretical approaches together in addressing the problem of 
‘reification’.60 I argue that this intellectual move inhibits critique, and tacitly supports the rise of a 
generic ‘Critical IR’ scholarly identity.  
Contestation between theoretical paradigms has long been seen to risk the collapse of IR as 
a saleable, scientific venture.61 Holsti (1989) argued that IR risked the rise of “pluralism without 
purpose… extreme theoretical and methodological relativism… an intellectual life without 
standards.”62 It has been argued that IR scholars must therefore seek to build bridges between major 
theoretical paradigms so as to recover a synoptic understanding of the discipline as a whole.63 
Hoffman was an early advocate for this kind of argument, arguing that Frankfurt School Critical 
Theory allows scholars to identify the strengths of each major IR paradigmatic approach and 
“show[…] how they can be drawn together” in synoptic dialogue.64 He expressly rejected claims 
that “drawing diverse perspectives into a synoptic whole is of no particular value,” and that IR 
theory should just be about “subversion of orthodoxies”.65  
It has been suggested that IR theoretical paradigms provide ‘windows’ or ‘perspectives’ on 
different aspects of international reality, which might be synthesised through dialogue.66 
“Practices”67 and “pragmatism” 68 have recently been proposed as potential focal points for such 
disciplinary dialogue. These approaches have been criticised for obfuscating substantive points of 
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contestation, since the existence of various IR theories reflects the existence of incommensurable 
theoretical choices.69 There is a serious risk of eliding what is at stake in partisan representations of 
international relations.70  
Daniel Levine responded to this problem in his 2012 book “Recovering International 
Relations: The promise of sustainable critique”.71 He argued here that to avoid eliding the political 
stakes between major architectures of problematization in IR, or “why particular issues come to be 
known as problems”, yet retain a synoptic vision for the discipline, necessitates a “critical-reflexive 
form of theory” in the Frankfurt School tradition. His understanding of critique sees it as an embrace 
of the vocation of practical reason, whilst holding in tandem the idea that all theory is reliant upon 
reification and cannot make good on its promises. His approach is dedicated to exposing “the 
interconnections between facts and values in international theory”,72 so as to allow for the recovery 
of IR to a synoptic “vocation” to support the positive stewardship of a complex world.  
Levine (2012) viewed a degree of “reification” as inherent to the “fact/value tradition from 
which a[ny] body of theory emerges”. Reification cannot be removed, but tactics can be devised by 
which to “remember its effects and contain them”.73 By “incorporating sensitivity” to each major 
theory’s specific reifications, each theory’s potential for excess can be “checked” in much the same 
way as one might check for “mistakes of logic, argument, or fact”.74 To "sustainably critique," then, 
is to recognise that all IR theoretical paradigms problematize the world in different but incomplete 
ways. Levine thus advocated for a “multi-paradigmatic” thinking, which “strives to manage 
reification in an ongoing manner” because each major paradigm can “tell stories in their own terms 
and counterbalance other stories, such that no single one can ever encompass the whole of a given 
event”.75 Levine’s recipe for Critical disciplinary synopsis was to hold all major paradigms in 
permanent torsion.76 It is by advancing nuance across these theories that critique allows progress 
for IR as a discipline without political de-contestation.77 
It follows from viewing critique as a function of reflexivity, vis-à-vis the problem of 
reification shared by all theories in IR, that being more nuanced is a defining aim for those who 
ascribe to a synoptic vision of Critical IR.78 This is an idea with a long heritage in the context of 
debates about theoretical pluralisation in IR. Holsti (1989) had argued that “the first significant 
purpose of pluralism is too alert us to oversimplification” in individual accounts.79 Hoffman (1987) 
advocated “moving back and forth between critical theoretical frameworks and individual 
perspectives”.80 The only rationalism committed to by such an approach, Hoffman (1988) wrote, 
would be an “limitless invitation to criticism”, and to the inherent fallibility of all truth claims.81 
Levine (2012) thus enriched and updated the synoptic account of the relationships between critique 
and disciplinary IR, developed in the late 1980s. His aim was not to establish which theories reify 
more or less.82 Rather, fostering chastened critique of each theory by the others creates conditions 
for more nuanced storytelling across the discipline.83  
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Viewing the objective of critique as being more nuanced about international issues has some 
well-known downsides. The ethical and political implications of nuance are contingent on 
circumstances, and in particular the unequal power relations between different theories in the 
academy, which Katz described.84 The problems with being assigned the role of reflexive ‘nuancer’ 
in IR are perhaps best encapsulated by Robert O Keohane (1989) in his account of feminist works 
as providing nuance to Liberalism, implying that the value of Feminism lay in its supplementary 
contribution.85 Feminist critics of the Frankfurt school approach advocated by Hoffman (1988) had 
already argued that seeking a synoptic ‘Critical’ next stage in the collective disciplinary 
conversation invariably meant that someone and some purpose would be rendered supplementary.86 
Critical scholars often express the belief that they are more nuanced about international issues than 
their ‘mainstream’ peers, but the practical result of bringing ‘critical’ IR theories into nuancing 
dialogue with other IR theories has most often been to reinforce settled problematizations and 
methods of interrogation.87 Effective critique is targeted at structural elements of other theories,88 
so the injunction to ‘be more nuanced’ must sometimes work in the opposite direction to critique. It 
is debatable whether “demands for more nuanced approaches” in IR could ever facilitate a break 
from settled disciplinary assumptions.89  
There is also a close family resemblance between the synoptic account of critique developed 
by Levine (2012) following Hoffman (1989), and the assumptions that have resulted in ‘Critical IR’ 
being widely used as a disciplinary identity or identifying category for scholars. Use of the label 
almost always implies that ‘being Critical’ entails being more sophisticated or nuanced. Levine 
himself argues that all theories are to some extent reflexive and need only to better “sustain their 
reflexive moment”: Reification is a technical error, dealt with like mistakes of logic or fact.90 But 
this sits in tension with the practical reality that naming a journal ‘Critical’ means it will attract 
submissions from a more or less predetermined set of theoretical approaches, and ideological 
commitments. Levine (2012), in practice, advanced an efficient argument that, due to its superior 
sophistication, Critical IR constitutes the only sustainable major paradigm in IR, notwithstanding 
his observation that critique has a “tendency to exclusionary counter-orthodoxies and ideologies”.91  
Viewing critique as a technical attribute of superior reflexivity, which can be extended to 
the discipline as a whole, also limits consideration of how claiming membership of ‘Critical IR’ is 
itself a performative act. It is well known that IR’s theoretical categories sustain their boundaries by 
obscuring internal diversity.92 Reflexivity, understood as attention to the reification characteristic to 
any analysis, cannot synthesise the diverse intellectual projects that sit within Critical IR - including; 
feminisms, anarchisms, decolonial theories, postcolonial theories, poststructuralisms, and marxisms 
- which vary in understanding of what constitutes a reification, or how reflexivity might be achieved. 
To identify reification (to suggest an academic opponent is confusing concepts with reality) is an 
interpretation deployed in academic disputes for a variety of purposes. One might accuse a reifying 
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scholar of falling foul of a methodological mistake, engaging in data manipulation to achieve a false 
positive, or suggest that they are racists motivated by more or less unconscious bias,93 or all the 
above. Unsurprisingly no IR scholar is generally keen to confuse concepts for reality. Rather, as 
Levine notes, all IR scholars (or professionally competent scholars from any academic field) assert 
‘reflexive’ means to acknowledge and control the role of assumptions in their work.  
This suggests that identifying reification may be little more than a value judgement projected 
at the categories used by others, tied to a claim to be the more reflexive. As Knafo (2016) argued, a 
claim to reflexivity can reflect the “certitude of reflexive scholars that they are on the ‘right side’ 
and thus often becomes a privileged vehicle for self-promotion”.94 Assigning a synoptic role to 
critique in IR necessitates the reification of reflexivity as a disciplinary method or technology. The 
category ‘Critical IR,’ inasmuch as it relies on this move, can thereby inhibit reflection on the 
meaning of the wide diversity of methodological, epistemological, ontological, political and ethical 
claims contained within it.  
 
Beyond IR? 
Reflexivity is subject to the eye of the beholder, since what defines any IR theoretical language are 
the things which cannot be said. This issue was raised by poststructuralists in the late 1980s, who 
argued against all attempts to speak with a “sovereign voice” about IR. Rather than pursuing a 
synoptic dialogue between IR theories, the poststructuralists sought “to enable the further circulation 
of the new strategies of questioning, analysis, and resistance that… have been found effective in 
one or another site and that might prove provocative and workable in other sites as well”.95 George 
and Campbell (1990) pointed out that the ambiguities within traditions are what provide the “space 
for critical exploration”.96 George (1989) lamented the ways in which gatekeeping forces authors to 
think in terms of either “incoherent babble” or “convergence” around a new orthodoxy.97 Ashley 
and Walker (1990) called for “dissident” international theorists, emerging “from the margins” in 
relationship to diverse sites of struggle in international politics, to “eschew [the] heroic promises” 
of each major theory that they should be the one to take the discipline forward to its next stage.98 
This imagined the project of critique in IR as Katz described minor theory, “it tears at the confines 
of major theory; pushing its limits to provoke a line of escape, a rupture—a tension out of which 
something else might happen”.99 
The poststructuralist writings of the late 1980s and 1990s have influenced IR scholars, across 
diverse IR theoretical subcultures, arguing that ‘Critical’ work is more closely aligned with the 
interests of the marginalised, repressed or ignored in the international arena than ‘mainstream’ IR. 
Being Critical, following Walker et al, was seen to signify a disruption of all settled theoretical 
assumptions and categories in IR, thus intrinsically allied to ethical and political concern for the 
interests of those marginalised by mainstream IR, such as “women, minorities, poor people, and 
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residents of small states.”100 In this section, I outline some of the downsides that have emerged, as 
the anti-synoptic understanding of the role of critique for IR has become widely accepted in the 
discipline since the 1990s.101 I will focus in particular on Decolonial IR and Queer IR. My purpose 
in selecting these theories for discussion is that both are still emerging as ‘minor theories’ within 
the field, are not yet fully institutionalised, and share an anti-synoptic account of the relationship 
between critique and the discipline.  
Decolonial scholars see eurocentric assumptions as constitutive to all international theory.102 
The aim of Decolonial theory, in line with longer established ‘postcolonial’ approaches, is to reveal 
the particularity of and “provincialize” assumptions common to theories rooted in western 
scholarship.103 Decolonising international theory aims to reveal the legacies of colonial history 
within IR theory, and in doing so make possible new insights into and approaches to world 
politics.104 This is expressly not a matter of pursuing nuance as a synoptic intellectual or disciplinary 
objective.105 In a recent work, Vitalis (2016) excavates the little-known history of the Howard 
School of International Affairs. Vitalis’ hope was “that an unvarnished account of [racisms] role in 
the founding of the US profession will matter to those… seeking to ‘decolonise the academy’”.106 
Revealing the history of the idea of racial hierarchy within disciplinary IR was to expose the 
historical, political and ethical contingency of all theorising in IR.  
Seeking to make IR theoretical traditions more attuned to the subject of race is not the same 
as decolonising them, however. The ‘decolonial theoretical option’, in Mignolo’s terminology, is a 
matter of thinking from the complex borderland of colonial histories, epistemologies and ontologies 
which have been and continue to be repressed by the ongoing condition of “coloniality”.107 
Decolonial approaches seek to draw from “alternative realities” constructed in these indigenous 
spaces, cultures and cosmologies, whilst ensuring these are not presented in too “broad brushstroke 
and one-dimensional ways”.108 Decolonial theory seeks to move creatively beyond a structural 
condition, identified as “coloniality,” by attending to local experiences of that condition. This 
project thus appears aligned, to some extent, with Deleuze and Guattari’s description of minor 
literatures, and Katz’s definition of “minor theory”, as disrupting established orthodoxies and rules 
that constrain expression, thinking and doing. 
The resonances with the work of the poststructuralists of the late 1980s are also notable, 
inasmuch as Decolonial IR theory does not offer a ‘Critical’ disciplinary synopsis. Decolonial theory 
sees itself as embarking upon an anti-synoptic movement ‘beyond’ the discipline. As a consequence, 
Decolonial theories are critically positioned with respect to IR as a discipline inclusive of all its 
major theories, including those self-describing as ‘Critical’. The substance of decolonial criticisms 
of ‘Postcolonial IR theory’, for example, has been that their borrowings from ‘colonial’ intellectual 
traditions mean that their critiques are stymied in advance. The fit of this theoretical project under 
the label ‘Critical IR’ is widely questioned. Capan (2017) notes, “decolonisation should not be used 
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inter- changeably with being critical of the field of International Relations. The roots of one’s 
disenchantment with the field may vary, and as such the direction of the ‘criticality’ itself… Being 
critical of International Relations and wanting to change the field does not amount to wanting to 
‘decolonise’ the field”. 109 Likewise, Tucker (2018) worries that “the ‘critique of IR’ serves… as an 
implicit or explicit master-frame [which] structures engagement with coloniality as a problem space 
in the discipline, making disciplinary assumptions and conventions the focal point of decolonial 
critique”.110 ‘Decolonial’ and ‘Critical’ IR theories are not inherently allied traditions. 
 Queer IR theory shows a similar concern to avoid its conflation with a generic idea of 
‘Critical IR’.111 Queer IR is a subculture of gender studies research which is concerned to sustain a 
marginal disciplinary status as distinct from Feminist, poststructuralist or Critical IR more broadly. 
Cynthia Weber’s (2015) response to the question ‘Why there is no Queer International Theory?’ 
asked why, given the range of contributions to the problematization of defining ‘international 
problems’ by queer theorists, including “war, security, sovereignty, intervention, hegemony, 
nationalism, empire, colonialism, and the general practice of foreign policy” such accounts had no 
presence in IR Journals. Weber argued that the absence of Queer Theory “from prestigious IR 
journals and book series… is the (un)conscious effect of how so-called Disciplinary IR codes 
various types of theory as failures”.  The marginal status of Queer theory was a function, she argued, 
of the heteronormative assumptions by which the major IR theories define their boundaries. Weber’s 
(2015) point was that all major IR theoretical “figurations are condensed maps of contestable 
worlds.”  Contesting the coherence of architectures of problematization within IR is described as 
“minor” theoretical work by Weber.112 
Weber did not advocate for the inclusion of Queer theory into the IR theoretical canon, in 
line with the anti-synoptic account developed by poststructuralists in the 1980s. She recounted 
instead how Critical Theory in IR has undergone a process of what she refers to as “gentrification” 
through conversations with major IR theoretical paradigms since the 1980’s. New theories, which 
developed new problematizations of international phenomena, had framed themselves as forming a 
“‘critical theory’ enclave, a kind of East Village of multiple, interdisciplinary-mixed IRs whose 
residents have relatives in a vast range of other disciplinary neighbourhoods”.113 Disciplinary IR 
scholars saw that engagements with the emerging “critical IR traditions were met with what they 
experienced as aggressive assaults on their core ideas and on the character of Disciplinary IR itself”. 
This resulted in the figuration of these contributions as unhelpful or unconstructive, but also 
“recognizing that this peripheral area producing marginalized intellectual ideas could potentially re-
centre and revive a discipline in crisis, some Disciplinary IR scholars took up residence in this edgy 
neighbourhood”.114 The result, Weber argued, was a “softening” of the more direct critiques of the 
major theoretical problematizations, which “created toned-down gentrified versions of critical IR’s 
ideas that were compatible with both what Disciplinary IR most valued (being ‘a realist and a 
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statist’) and what Disciplinary IR viewed as being critical enough”. Critical theories were made 
bearable for the disciplinary orthodoxy by ignoring structurally threatening critiques, and becoming 
more nuanced instead.115  
Construing the critical function of Queer theory as adding nuance or sophistication to other 
IR theories would be, in Weber’s account, to limit its capacity to unpick major theoretical 
problematizations, assumptions and mappings. Yet, it is also recognised that the pursuit of a 
sustainable position as intellectually marginal is fraught with uncertainty.116 With 
institutionalisation, any theoretical critique must shed the power to provoke breaks from common 
sense as settled assumptions (about, for example, what is a reification, who is reifying, and how 
reflexivity should be applied) are established. Just as the conflation of Decolonial theory with a 
generic understanding of ‘IR Criticality’ risks flattening or generalization of indigenous worlds,117 
Queer theorists like Weber worry explicitly about the generic valorisation of minor theoretical status 
under a new disciplining “anti-normativity norm”.118  
A response to this logical problem facing all minor theoretical work in IR, in recent years, 
has been to emphasise the constitutive role of failure in all critiques, drawing on the queer theorist 
Halberstam.119 As Sjoberg put it “failure should be understood as a key part of practices of critique”. 
Indeed, “reflexivity can exist without the desire for success; critique can revel in its failures rather 
than striving not to fail; critical security studies can be critical security studies without a coherent 
narrative of its purposes, shared values, and goals.”120 The currency of this discourse of ‘critical 
failure’ appears to reflect the structural problem facing all anti-synoptic accounts of critique outlined 
by Katz: Minor theoretical status is inherently transient and contextual, and creates no safe harbour 
in which to anchor common intellectual projects. 
The roots of this issue in IR were already observed by Holden (2002), who referred to the 
“new conceptions of intellectual radicalism within Western academies” which arose during the latter 
part of the twentieth century, and gave rise to an intellectual aesthetic that generically valorised the 
peripheral, the dissenter, and the marginalised outsider.121 The subsequent proliferation of self-
consciously ‘marginal’ academic tribes in IR, as in other social scientific disciplines, was supported 
by changing material incentive structures which rewarded academic specialisation and 
abstraction.122 The accelerating churn of minor turns, moments, and concepts de jour that this 
aesthetic has given rise to has been productive in quantitative terms of fostering new minor scholarly 
subcultures. But as these theoretical subcultures coalesce into stable disciplinary formations or 
categories, their minor status naturally dissipates, recurrently leading to the launch of new 
theoretical turns, which tend towards more radical or maximalist positions, so as to recapture 
‘marginal’ or ‘dissident’ academic status.123  
This process has implications for how conversations between minor theories in IR have 
developed. Queer and Decolonial IR, for example, are critical of the discipline in quite different 
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ways, respectively concerned with IR’s heteronormativity and coloniality. It is possible to connect 
these two concerns, but thinking this connection requires theory-building so as to explain how 
heteronormativity may be linked to coloniality across different contexts.124 Such intra-minor 
theoretical alliances must be constructed, yet the minor disturbance of settled assumptions does not 
itself provide any reliable synthetic tools.125 Because theoretical synthesis cannot arise from minor 
theorisation as such, minor theories cannot preclude failures of synthesis (say, in the form of queer 
racism or decolonial homophobia).  
The problem of synthesis stalks all self-defining Critical approaches to IR. Defining the 
terms of reference for intellectual dissidence in relation to IR’s “disciplinary crisis”, as the 
poststructuralists did in viewing critique as a function of disciplinary marginality, created conditions 
ripe for viewing any competitor theory as problematic to the degree that they can be deemed 
insufficiently minor.126 The idea that critique necessitates moving ‘beyond IR’ as an inherently 
majoritarian project has become a widely expressed trope. The result is that Critical IR theorists 
now engage in increasingly virulent disagreements over the political and ethical implications of 
disciplinarity itself. In a condition of perpetual abeyance, claimants to Critical IR become hostages 
to a continuous risk of being exposed as insufficiently pure of the (modernist, racist, colonial, 
patriarchal, heteronormative, capitalist) traces of ‘the major literature/discipline’. At the same time, 
Critical IR scholars who advocate for a disciplinary exit in search of ‘more Critical’ inter-disciplines 
have found themselves wrestling with the charge of pre-judgement:127 Since they appear to know 
what ‘Being Critical’ will look like after de-disciplinarisation, critique takes the form of testing 
whether other scholars meet these pre-given criteria.128  
This stream in contemporary IR scholarship ignores the manners in which minor theories, 
far from tending towards alliances, are often set to contradictory political and ethical purposes. And 
that the visions of world politics created by scholars ‘moving beyond’ disciplinary IR can be just as 
problematic as visions already settled within the discipline. Contemporary political and social 
movements borrow intellectual resources from various (once or still) minor theoretical traditions in 
IR to think against a ‘Globalist’ world order, incorporating the Gramscian position that ‘politics is 
downstream from culture’, the ideal of a transgressive emancipatory identity, and the critique of 
neo-colonialism.129 The philosopher Alain De Benoist wrote his manifesto for the New Right in the 
year 2000 with the aim of challenging the oppressive implications of major international theories, 
especially Liberalism, borrowing widely from resources of minor intellectual critique.130 This theory 
is marginal in disciplinary IR, but influential amongst populist politicians like Putin, Trump, Orban, 
Salvini and Le Pen, as well as online communities of Race Realists, western chauvinists, and white 
nationalists. It proposes that Liberalism destroys the autonomy of ethnicities and cultures, and that 
the history of the west has been one of ongoing cultural as well as political colonialism. De Benoist’s 
17	
	
argument is that the project of decolonisation is incomplete, and continues through international aid 
and UN-led Liberal paternalism.  
The answer proposed by the New Right is to restore a truly independent status to diverse 
cultures and indigenous world-views in International Relations, and suggest that people belonging 
to these ‘birth-cultures’ must actively work towards their national and cognitive emancipation from 
all the baggage of Liberal modernity, if necessary, through violently closing borders. The New Right 
claims its intellectual marginality vis-à-vis Liberalism or Globalism (understood as the ideological 
representative of modernism in international thought) is a marker of its virtue. The New Right is 
not, however, viewed as a ‘Critical ally’ of Decolonial IR theory. 
A claim to minor theoretical status is also visible amongst reactionary theorists of gender, 
including online groups of men’s rights activists, western chauvinist militias like the Proud Boys, 
or traditionalist ‘family values’ movements. 131 These groups develop an operative concept of the 
radical intellectual margins as central to their understandings of critique, and of the emancipatory 
relationship which their critique has to hegemonic theoretical frameworks that they perceive as 
oppressing them: Liberalism or ‘Cultural Marxism’. 132 These actors see their critiques of what they 
term “gender ideology” as part of a necessary escape from the straightjacket of modernist categories, 
currently hegemonic in contemporary academia. In other words, the belief that transgressive or 
marginal theory is emancipatory has diverse advocates, whose anti-modernism or anti-hegemonism 
comes with divergent attitudes to gender, race, culture, economics, social, political and international 
organisation.  
The sociological implications of this point were anticipated, but not fully developed, by Katz 
(1996), who noted that: 
 
“talk of exclusion can lead to an unsavory hierarchy of marginalization—a kind of competitive 
victimology—and even to the cul-de-sac of an essentialist identity politics. Notions of exclusion are 
all about, one might even say tautologically about, position, and if we are not careful they can lead 
to relativist accounts that offer little of practical value. And they can be disingenuous—
proclamations of exclusion by scholars who are quite included”.133  
 
The historical moment facing critique calls us to recognise that minor theories infer no allied 
ethics or politics. There is no cohesive and abiding sovereign ‘logic of modernity’ that forms the 
superstructure of disciplinary IR, and gives assurance that the post-disciplinary avant-guard will 
share an understanding of virtue. The romanticism characteristic of self-describing Critical 
intellectual cultures that arose in IR in the immediate Post-Cold War context must now be 
reconsidered. Many of the same intellectual tools are now being effectively mobilised by 
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reactionaries, racists and gender absolutists. Contemporary reactionaries have read their Deleuze, 
their Gramsci, their Derrida and Foucault,134 and they are cognizant of the discursive logic and 
rhetorical power of, for example, concepts of exclusion, identity, precarity, marginality, hegemony, 
the avant-guard, victimhood and indigeneity135. 
The challenge facing scholars in IR who seek to write in the service of vulnerable groups, 
like migrants lacking a safe home state, those who do not fit with heteronormative gender roles, or 
the victims of racism, is that their reactionary theoretical interlocutors have recognised the power in 
claiming to be uniquely reflexive critics, intellectually marginal vis-à-vis dominant theoretical 
assumptions about IR. The category ‘Critical IR’ provides no tools by which to counter these 
relativistic arguments. In this context, the belief that ‘Being Critical’ requires a minoritarian exit 
from disciplinary IR may be a distraction from developing methodologically and epistemologically 
rigorous critiques, that can be communicated as such. Faith in the emancipatory intellectual margins 
brings to mind Latour’s worry that self-describing ‘Critical’ scholars today are like “those 
mechanical toys that endlessly make the same gesture when everything else has changed around 
them.”136  
 
What is a minor international theory?  
Critical IR theories once considered marginal have been partially absorbed by ‘mainstream’ 
paradigms, or become major literatures in their own right. Many institutionally powerful IR scholars 
today were once described, by themselves or others, as marginalised ‘Critical’ thinkers. The 
prevalence of ‘Critical IR’ as a definitional category for identifying privileged yet marginal ‘kinds 
of academic’, now almost a cliché in the discipline, should concern any scholar committed to 
rigorous academic critique of settled disciplinary assumptions.  
Critical theories (in the plural, not singular) are minor insofar as they are critical. But the 
category Critical clearly does not always signify minor theoretical work. It is a major category in 
contemporary IR, and the adoption and use of that category has come to interrupt the very conditions 
for critique. The distinction between minor and major uses of theory, as developed in this article, 
suggests we should view critique in IR as operationalised suspicion about settled norms of 
problematization within the discipline. Critique is a constitutive academic practice, which deploys 
minor theorisation to make possible the creation of novel ideas. Yet minor theory is inherently 
mutable, transient and contextual. Critique is constitutively unsustainable, and morally and 
politically ambiguous. Minor theoretical contributions are taken up by PhD students, and other 
scholars, and over time may be established as major approaches in their own right, as 
poststructuralist IR has been. The point is not that minor theories will always turn into major 
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theories. Rather, because they are relationally constituted, minor status is simply unstable as well as 
normatively ambivalent.  
In the context of IR’s professionalization since the 1980s, minor theories sought to capture 
intellectual resources, secure jobs, and publish work in journals sympathetic to their own 
methodological, epistemological and ontological innovations. In the 1980s and 1990s, the 
dominance of positivist, US centric scholarship, provided ample pragmatic grounds to seeking 
common cause with heterogynous minor theories, with the purpose of carving out shared 
professional space for these approaches. The label Critical was contested from the outset, but 
because there were professional and economic drivers for seeking common cause across minor 
theories, the category of ‘Critical IR’ came to be widely adopted despite disagreements about what 
it signified. Critical IR entails no inherent unity, binding together all minor theories, and it is likely 
that relatively few IR scholars believe that it does. The category ‘Critical IR’ functions rather as a 
sociological placeholder, of rhetorical use in manoeuvring for professional advancement and 
influence within the discipline.  
This rhetoric has consequences. Self-defining ‘Critical IR Scholars’ tend to oscillate 
between ignoring those who also use the label, but with whom they disagree about matters of 
concern, and engaging in competitive wars of purity against other self-describing Critical scholars, 
who they may accuse of being racists, homo/transphobic, or crypto-capitalists due to their 
contamination by ‘disciplinary’ baggage.137 Indeed, showing insufficient distain for disciplinarity 
may itself be read as a sign of failing to be critical enough.138 Whilst in the past there may have 
been less harm in self-defining using the category ‘Critical’ for professional advancement, slippage 
between this use of the category and sympathy for the inference that those who do not self-describe 
as such are ‘un-Critical’ was perhaps inevitable.  
The degree of family resemblance between some self-describing Critical theories in IR 
reflects the pre-existing political and ethical assumptions of academics who already share a milieu. 
Inasmuch as the label ‘Critical’ acts as a signal for moral and political virtue within that milieu, it 
can embolden methodologically shallow argumentation, foster bunkerisation, paranoia, witch-
hunts, and insularity. What emerged as a gathering place born of necessity, in an academic space 
that looked radically different from the pluralist disciplinary context that is IR today, risks becoming 
a shorthand for claiming (minor) moral probity, and hunting out (major) impurity in others. Critique, 
because it necessitates a minor use of theory, involves scepticism or suspicion about settled 
assumptions or categories. Self-defining as ‘Critical’, is contrariwise to suggest that the disruption 
of settle assumptions is a category unto itself, which implies virtuous political and ethical status, 
and a romanticised scholarly identity. In forgetting that critique because it necessitates minor theory 
is morally ambivalent, self-describing Critical IR theorists have invited their publics to view them 
as no more than an alternative set of ideologues.139  
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De-romanticising critical theoretical activity in IR is the task recommended by this article. 
This is to acknowledge that within the so-called ‘mainstream’ of IR Theory, minor theoretical work 
takes place, and ‘Critical IR’ has always incorporated a lot of major theory building. In IR, minor 
theories can and have collapsed into major theories, as various Critical Schools have in recent years 
developed and honed their own distinctive brands, like Feminist IR Theory, Critical Security 
Studies, and International Political Sociology. Minor international theories can constitute major 
theories in some settings but not others. Minor theories can also, however, remain minor everywhere 
and advocate (successfully) for lamentable, regressive or cruel politics in the name of emancipation.  
As such, I am certainly not suggesting that those who currently call themselves ‘Critical’ 
should start referring to themselves as minor theorists instead, but “a change in vocabulary” is 
nonetheless worth considering.140 Simply abandoning use of the category of ‘Critical IR’ and the 
‘Critical IR Scholar’ from scholarly parlance could help critique in IR to become more 
methodologically rigorous. As recent rhetorical disputes between self-describing ‘Critical’ 
traditions testify, competition about who is the ‘most Critical’ can vitiate the open potential in any 
IR theory.141 Analyses are degraded and receive a degree of inoculation from appropriate scholarly 
evaluation, when self-describing Critical Scholars imply that ethical and political purity (which may 
be defined variously) is the purpose and outcome of critique.142  
Secondly, dropping the categories of ‘Critical IR’ and the ‘Critical IR Scholar’ will help 
scholarly critique in IR to become more useful, inasmuch as it will be communicable to relevant 
audiences as distinct from ideology. Categorisation is an issue for all academic disciplines, and all 
categories in IR mask internal diversity. The issue with the category of Critical IR is not just that it 
obfuscates a peculiarly expansive diversity. Rather the problem which applies to this category 
specifically takes the form of a problematic intuition that the disciplinary margins will necessarily 
be intellectually allied with each other. The result is that the label ‘Critical IR’ is widely seen, by its 
advocates, to entails at least some essential normative, ideological, ethical and political, positions. 
This is why the New and Far Right are engaged so keenly with the arguments of self-describing 
Critical IR scholars, and are able to effectively to create mirror discourses.143 Turning critique into 
a category inhibits its communicability as distinct from ideological claim-making. In deploying this 
category, therefore, ‘Critical IR Scholars’ have unnecessarily blunted their own tools for engaging 
with political and ethical controversies, and in doing so, given succour to their ideologically opposed 
interlocutors.144  
 Disciplinary IR signifies a loose ecosystem of academic posts, institutions, journals, think 
tanks, debates, theoretical frameworks, methods and approaches, which overlap with various other 
academic disciplines. IR has always been traced by multi-disciplinary influences. Critiquing IR is 
not ‘good’ in some cosmic sense. Rather, there are multiple ways to critique IR, and this is good for 
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academia because it allows for the proliferation of edifying minor research agendas, which disturb 
settled theoretical assumptions and in doing so, may shed new light on matters of concern.   
 The continued search for a critical synopsis of disciplinary IR justifies, after the fact, the 
problematic construction of ‘Critical IR’ as a major theoretical category over the last 30 years. The 
conduct of minor theoretical work in IR has been inhibited by the institutionalisation of ‘Critical 
IR’ as a synoptic identity or category. ‘Critical IR’ is a uniquely problematic category because, as 
well as masking internal diversity, it undermines the conditions for critique by implying that it 
constitutes a normative alliance of methods and/or identities, rather than a descriptor of any work 
that disturbs settled assumptions. Critique does not require moving ‘beyond’ IR. Rather it is, I would 
like to believe, simply part of the vocation of any IR theorist to make minor contributions. A certain 
way of talking about and claiming criticality in IR “has sent us down the wrong path.”145 Though it 
has provided an academic home for many of us, it could now serve to enrich debates, in particular 
about the politics and ethics of theory in our field, if the category of ‘Critical IR’ and the ‘Critical 
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